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ACUS-And Administrative Law-
Then and Now 
Michael Herz* 
ABSTRACT 
The Administrative Conference of the United States ("ACUS") both 
shapes and reflects the intellectual, policy, and practical concerns of the field 
of administrative law. Its recommendations are therefore a useful lens 
through which to view that field. Also, because of an unfortunate hiatus, 
ACUS has gotten underway not once but twice. Those two beginnings pro-
vide a kind of natural experiment, and they make a revealing contrast. This 
article traces the transformations of American administrative law, as well as 
the field's perpetual concerns, by comparing the initial recommendations of 
ACUS 1.0 (1968 to 1970) with the initial recommendations of ACUS 2.0 (2010 
· to 2013). ACUS issued its first recommendations in 1968. At the time, Rich-
ard Stewart's celebrated article, The Reformation of American Administra-
tive Law, was still seven years away, and the rise of the interest representation 
model Professor Stewart identified was underway but not complete. Since 
then, administrative law has continued to be reformed, moving away from the 
interest representation model. Certain issues-for example, transparency, effi-
ciency, and meaningful public participation-remain central preoccupations. 
However, new technologies, a shift from adjudication to rulemaking, the influ-
ence of the unitary executive model, and other developments, all woven into 
the more recent recommendations, make the contemporary field quite differ-
ent from your grandfather's administrative law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Gilbert and Sullivan's The Pirates of Penzance, or the Slave of 
Duty,1 our hero, Frederic, is apprenticed to a band of pirates until he 
turns twenty-one. Just as he is about to reach the keenly anticipated 
end of his apprenticeship, it is revealed that he was born on February 
29th in a leap year. Under the articles of apprenticeship, he is inden-
tured until his twenty-first birthday, not his twenty-first year. Accord-
ingly, he is only a quarter of the way through. Hilarity ensues. 
This celebration of the Administrative Conference's fiftieth anni-
versary confronts the inverse problem. Whereas Frederic had seen 
twenty-one years but far fewer than twenty-one birthdays, ACVS has 
seen fifty birthdays but not fifty years. It was "born" in August 1964, 
when President Johnson signed the Administrative Conference Act.2 
But there have been a few gaps-if ACUS were a job applicant, it 
would have a lot of explaining to do about the holes in its resume. 
First, it took four years to get up and running.3 Then, as everyone in 
1 1 W .S. Gilbert, The Pirates of Penzance, or the Slave of Duty, in THE ANNOTATED Gu--
BERT AND SuLLIVAN 83 (Ian Bradley ed. , 1982). 
2 Administrative Conference Act, Pub. L. No. 88-499, 78 Stat. 615 (1964) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 591-96 (2012)). 
3 President Johnson nominated Jerre Williams as the first Chairman of ACUS on October 
14, 1%7. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 1969 ANNUAL REPORT: ADMINISTRATIVE CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 4 (1970). Williams was confirmed five days later; he actually got to 
work on January 8, 1968; the first plenary session was in May 1968. Id. at 4, 26. The then-head 
of the Office of Legal Counsel, Frank Wozencraft, points to three reasons for the delay. First, 
standing up the new agency was "nobody's priority," and everyone was just very busy. Tran-
script: Forty-Second Session of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 53 U. PITT. L. 
REv. 857, 864 (1992) (remarks of Frank Wozencraft). Second, "it was a strange animal, a her-
2015] ACUS-AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-THEN AND NOW 1219 
the administrative law world knows only too well, it was defunded in 
the mid-1990s, only reemerging in 2010. 
Thus, there is a nice jurisprudential question as to whether this 
fiftieth anniversary celebration is quite kosher. However, if rigid liter-
alism was good enough for the Pirate King and the wretched Frederic, 
it is good enough for me. So, fifty Augusts having come and gone 
since ACUS was created, I am delighted to be participating in this 
tribute to ACUS on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary (give or 
take). 
Indeed, I would like to take advantage of ACUS's awkward four-
teen-and-a-half year dormant period to structure my contribution to 
this special issue. The hibernation resulted in, as they are usually re-
ferred to, "ACUS 1.0" and "ACUS 2.0."4 ACUS got underway not 
once but twice; not once but twice it surveyed the field of administra-
tive law looking for important topics-areas of solvable inefficiency or 
unfairness, to use the terms that recur in its statute.5 But those two 
beginnings were far apart in time-ten February 29ths had come and 
gone between them. The world was a rather different place in 2010 
than it had been in 1968. Accordingly, reviewing the recommenda-
tions from ACUS's first three years-or, to be precise, from ACUS's 
first first three years-and comparing them with those from ACUS's 
second first three years will reveal something about how the world of 
administrative law has, and has not, changed. 
maphrodite combination of Government and public members . . . . Until the Conference existed, 
it was very hard to imagine what it would be like, what it would actually do. Its mission blended 
the academic approach with the practical problems of Government. That's what makes ACUS 
so valuable, but it made it hard to sell." Id. And, finally, "it was unbelievably difficult to find 
the first chairman." Id. 
4 I believe it was Jeffrey Lubbers who first used these terms. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, 
ACUS 2.0 and Its Historical Antecedents, AoMIN. & REo . L. NEws, Spring 2011 , at 9. 
5 The original Administrative Conference Act expressed Congress's desire to ensure 
"maximum effidency and fairness" in the administrative process, Administrative Conference 
Act§ 2(b), noted agency heads' responsibility to "assur[e) fair and efficient administrative pro-
cedure," id. § 2(c), articulated the desire that "private rights may be fully protected and . . . 
Federal responsibilities may be carried out expeditiously," id. § 2(e), and charged ACUS with 
studying "the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative procedure used by adminis-
trative agencies," id. § 5(a). ACUS 2.0 operates under a slightly different and broader set of 
legislative purposes, see 5 U.S.C. § 591, but the key provision regarding "powers and duties" 
remains unchanged. In particular, each incarnation was given the authority to "study the effi-
ciency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative procedure used by administrative agencies in 
carrying out administrative programs, and make recommendations." Administrative Conference 
Act § 5(a); 5 U.S.C. § 594(1). 
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I. THE AGES OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Before turning to the recommendations themselves, it is worth 
getting a sense of the lay of the land. ACUS has not operated in a 
vacuum; it has been both a shaper, and a product, of the political, 
judicial, and academic preoccupations that characterized its different 
eras. Thus, it makes sense to begin with a review of the overall set-
tings in which it has operated. 
The central conceptual project of administrative law is to legiti-
mate and cabin agencies' exercise of discretion. Scholars have laid out 
a generally accepted historical account of the shifting approaches to 
this challenge.6 A century ago, agency exercises of discretionary au-
thority were justified under the so-called "transmission belt" theory, 
under which agencies truly were agents and Congress remained the 
principal.7 On this account, agencies had little discretion; they merely 
found facts and implemented the legislature's policy prescriptions in 
light thereof.8 The traditional model emphasized the necessity of leg-
islative authorization of, and constraints on, agency discretion, as well 
as reliance on procedures designed to ensure compliance with legisla-
tive directives and the availability of judicial review to do the same.9 
The traditional model began to crack with the New Deal, when it 
became inescapably clear that the assumptions on which it was based 
were simply inaccurate. Agencies were exercising significant discre-
tion, barely constrained by legislative directive.10 A different theory 
of legitimacy was needed, and it was found in the principle of agency 
expertise. On this understanding, agencies face decisions that are es-
sentially technocratic and have right and wrong answers; because 
agencies base their decisions on expertise, concerns about whim, pref-
6 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL. , ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POL-
ICY 17-29 (7th ed. 2011); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the 
Administrative State, 81 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1403-16 (2013); Sidney Shapiro et al., The 
Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REv. 463, 471-76 (2012); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administra-
tive Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1671-76 (1975) . 
7 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 6, at 1675. 
8 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 
CoLUM. L. REv. 1749, 1758 (2007). 
9 See id. ("By confining agencies to legislative directives, administrative procedures, as 
enforced by the Court, served to promote fairness and rationality."). 
10 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Ad-
ministrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 471 (2003) (noting that the transmission belt theory 
"simply did not describe the government we had after about 1930"); Stewart, supra note 6, at 
1677 (" [A]fter the delegation by New Deal Congresses of sweeping powers . . . the broad and 
novel character of agency discretion could no longer be concealed behind such labels."). 
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erence, clashing values, or ideology can be set aside. As Richard 
Stewart has put it, on this model "persons subject to the administra-
tor's control are no more liable to his arbitrary will than are patients 
remitted to the care of a skilled doctor. "11 
The expertise model, too, suffered from exposure to the real 
world. Already, during the debates over the Administrative Proce-
dure Act ("APA"),12 adopted in 1946, expansive agency discretion had 
many critics. The AP A can be seen as a compromise, accepting 
agency policymaking and enforcement discretion while seeking to 
avoid its abuse through the twin tools of procedural protections and 
judicial review.13 That compromise held for the next two decades, as 
the traditional understandings matured but were not abandoned.14 
The mid-1960s, however, saw another shift, and it was a funda-
mental one. As "[p]ublic trust in regulation and the administrative 
process began to disintegrate," courts became more aggressive in re-
viewing the substance of agency decisions and in requiring expansive 
procedures.15 This was also a period of intense concern that agencies 
had been captured by the very interests they were supposed to be reg-
ulating.16 The cure for capture was seen as full participation by all 
affected interests.17 So, just as the transmission belt model had 
yielded to the expertise model, now the expertise model yielded to an 
"interest representation" model.18 On this account, the administrative 
process was legitimate because, and only to the extent that, it repli-
cated the pluralist legislative process; therefore all interests had to be 
able to participate fully and effectively. In particular, agencies and the 
courts had to open their doors to regulatory beneficiaries. 
The interest representation model yielded in turn, about fifteen 
years later, to a focus on presidential control. Sidney Shapiro calls 
this the "counter-reformation."19 The roots of modern presidentialism 
can be found in the Nixon Administration's Quality of Life Review, 
11 Stewart, supra note 6, at 1678. 
12 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) . 
13 BREYER ET AL, supra note 6, at 22. 
14 Id. at 23. 
1s Id. at 24. 
16 Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-/983, 72 Ctt1.-KENT L. REv. 
1039, 1050 (1997). 
17 See, e.g., Simon Lazarus & Joseph Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REv. 
1069, 1074-76, 1092-106 (1971). 
18 See Stewart, supra note 6, at 1722-30. 
19 Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith 
in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. R EV. 689, 697, 707-08 (2000). 
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but it was the arrival of Ronald Reagan in the White House in 1981 
that marked the real beginning of the era of "presidential administra-
tion. "20 This model highlights the president's unique position as the 
one government official who is nationally elected. The theory empha-
sizes the unitary executive, centralized regulatory review, and legiti-
mation through presidential control.21 
Have we left this era of presidential control? Not really; presi-
dential administration is as robust as ever.22 But it is possible that the 
model may be changing in important ways yet again: 
Unlike past transformations, the most important current de-
velopments are not legal in nature; they are technological. 
Administrative law now both relies on and is shaped by the 
Internet and associated technologies. . . . [A]gency Web 
sites, use of social media, "e-rulemaking," wide dissemina-
tion of government information via the Internet-these have 
transformed the day-to-day operations of agencies. . . . 
Many see technological innovation as promising to funda-
mentally transform the nature of administration and the rela-
tionship between agency and citizen, enabling a new era of 
democratic participation, cooperation, and informed agency 
decisionmaking. 23 
Accepting at least the rough outlines of this thumbnail sketch, 
ACUS straddles three periods. It got under way just at the moment 
that the "reformation" was starting to take hold; it was in operation, 
and then on unpaid leave, as the presidential model became ascen-
dant; and it returned to business as agencies were rapidly deploying 
new technologies. In particular, ACUS's two beginning periods oc-
curred just as new conceptualizations of the administrative process 
were-or may now be-taking hold. Accordingly, ACUS's work 
product should reflect these shifts, or at least display different empha-
ses in different eras. On the other hand, the agency has operated 
under the same statutory mandate and with the same basic structure 
20 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2276-80 (2001) 
(observing that President Reagan laid the foundation for an administrative state that functioned 
as an extension of the president's policy agenda); see also Bressman, supra note 10, at 487. Presi-
dent Reagan 's most important initiative was Executive Order 12,291, which established the mod-
ern version of centralized review of proposed regulations by the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127-34 (1982). 
21 See Bressman, supra note 10, at 485-87; Kagan, supra note 20, at 2331-32. 
22 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance 
of O/RA, 37 HARV. J.L. & Pua. PoL'Y 447, 454-63 (2014). 
23 BREYER ET AL., supra note 6, at 29. 
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throughout, which should bring a certain consistency of theme and 
approach. 
II. IN THE BEGINNING 
Between 1968 and 1970, the Administrative Conference pro-
duced twenty-two recommendations, which will be the focus of this 
review. These seem enough to be a representative sample, while still 
reflecting a particular moment in time. Three years is a pretty long 
"moment," to be sure, but in the grand scheme of things, it is quite 
brief. It provides a snapshot, not a movie. Or, if a movie, then My 
Dinner with Andre,24 not Boyhood.25 These recommendations also 
make a tidy, self-contained corpus because they were all published 
together in the first volume of ACUS's Recommendations and Re-
ports.26 The review for ACUS 2.0 will cover the same length of time; 
this second set of recommendations numbers twenty-five, produced 
from the end of 2010 through 2013.27 
A. Four Major Themes 
What seem to have been the major issues confronting the wise 
men of administrative law28 in 1968? Various characterizations of the 
first twenty-two recommendations are possible, but the following 
themes dominate: transparency, reducing delay and inefficiency, en-
hancing public participation in agency proceedings, and increasing the 
availability of judicial review. 
24 MY DINNER WITH ANDRE (Saga Prods., Inc. 1981). 
25 BOYHOOD (IFC Prods. 2014). 
26 1 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U .S., RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1968-1970) [hereinafter RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND REPORTS]. 
27 The twenty-two recommendations from the first three years of ACUS 1.0, numbers 68-1 
through 70-5, are summarized in Appendix A , infra. The twenty-five recommendations pro-
duced during the first three years of ACUS 2.0, numbers 2010-1 through 2013-7 (plus Statement 
18), are summarized in Appendix B, infra. 
28 And they were indeed (almost) all men. As of 1970, the Chairman was male, the ten-
member Council was all male, and the eighty-six then present and former members of the Con-
ference included a grand total of three women: Carolyn Agger, Patricia Harris, and Charlotte 
Tuttle Lloyd. See REc oMMENDA TIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at ii, 3-6. By contrast, as of 
this writing, four of the nine Council members are female, see Council Roster, AoMIN. CoNF. 
U.S., http://www.acus.gov/directory/council (last visited Sept. 5, 2015), as are thirty-seven of the 
eighty-two members of the Assembly, see Government Members Roster, ADMIN. CoNF. U.S., 
http://www.acus.gov/directory/government-member (last visited Sept. 5, 2015); Public Members 
Roster, ADMIN. CoNF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov/directory/public-member (last visited Sept. 5, 
2015). So one highly notable change between ACUS 1.0 and 2.0 is in the gender (im)balance 
within the Conference (and the field , and the profession, generally). 
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1. Transparency 
Though the term is anachronistic and cannot be found in the 
early reports or recommendations, what we would now call trans-
parency was a fundamental concern in the early recommendations. 
Indeed, it is central to a significant plurality of these recommenda-
tions. For example: 
• Recommendation 68-2 pointed out that the U.S. Government 
Manual, the official handbook of the federal government, con-
tained descriptions of agencies that were often "outdated, un-
revealing, cumbersome, or otherwise deficient. "29 It urged all 
agencies to review and rewrite their entries, and, in particular, 
to include therein instructions as to how to obtain additional 
information.30 
• Recommendation 68-331 offered a similar lament about the 
Parallel Table of Statutory Authorities and Rules.32 This is a 
two-column list of all statutory provisions on which agencies 
relied in issuing regulations, together with the Code of Federal 
Regulations citations for those regulations.33 The recommen-
dation reported that the Table was highly inaccurate and in-
complete and urged agencies to submit cleaned-up versions to 
the Office of the Federal Register.34 
• Recommendation 68-4 urged publication of a "Consumer Bul-
letin," circulated to "the press, consumer organizations, public 
and scholastic libraries, and individuals who request to be put 
on the mailing list," which would describe recent federal 
agency actions of interest and significance to consumers.35 
• Recommendation 69-3, Publication of a "Guide to Federal Re-
porting Requirements," recommended publishing a listing of 
29 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 68-2, U.S. GOVERNMENT OR-
GANIZATION MANUAL 1 (1968), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/us-government-organiza-
tion-manual. 
30 Id. 
31 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 68-3, PARALLEL TABLE OF 
STATUTORY AuTHORITIES AND RuLES (2 CFR CH. I) 1 (1968), https://www.acus.gov/recommen-
dation/parallel-table-statutory-authorities-and-rules-2-cfr-ch-i. 
32 See Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, C.F.R. INDEX 833 (2014), http://www.gpo 
.gov/help/parallel_table.pdf. 
33 Id. 
34 RECOMMENDATION 68-3, supra note 31, at 12. 
35 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 68-4, CONSUMER BULLETIN 1 
(1968) , http://www.acus.gov/recommendation/consumer-bulletin. 
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agency reporting requirements and their statutory or regula-
tory bases.36 
• Recommendation 69-4 urged agencies to determine whether 
analytic subject indexes for their Code of Federal Regulations 
("CFR") volumes would be appropriate and, if so, to produce 
such indexes.37 
• Recommendation 69-6 called on agencies to compile statistics 
regarding all their proceedings-rulemaking and adjudication, 
formal and informal-indicating how many of each were initi-
ated, concluded, and pending each year.38 
• Recommendation 70-2 was a set of proposals regarding the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") no-action 
letter process "intended to enable the public and individual 
stockholders to be more fully advised of the interpretations, 
policies and precedents which guide the conclusions of the 
Commission and the staff. "39 
Finally, Recommendation 70-5 concerned the processes of the 
now-defunct Renegotiation Board, which was authorized to eliminate 
"excessive profits" earned by any government contractor receiving 
more than $1 million a year.40 The recommendation called on the 
Board to make public the apparently mysterious factors on which it 
relied in determining whether profits were "excessive."41 
In reading these recommendations, it is striking how strongly the 
Conference seemed to feel that the general public, regulated entities, 
and even sophisticated players were operating in the dark. Govern-
ment operations appear to have been extraordinarily opaque. In part, 
36 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 69-3, PUBLICATION OF A 
"GUIDE TO FEDERAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS" 1 (1969), https://www.acus.gov/recommenda-
tion/publication-guide-federal-reporting-requirements. 
37 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 69-4, ANALYTICAL SUBJECT-
INDEXES TO SELECTED VOLUMES OF THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 1 (1969), https:// 
www.acus.gov/recommendation/analytical-subject-indexes-selected-volumes-code-federal-
regulations. 
38 ACUS Recommendation 69-6, Compilation of Statistics on Administrative Proceedings 
by Federal Departments and Agencies, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-6 (1993). 
39 ADMIN. CoNFERENCE oF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 70-2, SEC No-ACTION LETTERS 
UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, at 1(1970) https://www.acus.gov/recommen-
dation/sec-no-action-letters-under-section-4-securi ties-act-1933. 
40 STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 93D CONG., SUMMARY OF 
RENEGOTIATION ACT OF 1951 AND RENEGOTIATION BOARD PROPOSAL FOR EXTENSION 
(Comm. Print 1973). 
41 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U .S., RECOMMENDATION 70-5, PRACTICES AND PROCE-
DURES UNDER THE RENEGOTIATION ACT OF 1951, at 1 (1970) http://www.acus.gov/recommen-
dation/practices-and-procedures-under-renegotiation-act-1951. 
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the problems were of the most fundamental sort; they involved the 
inability to find law. Beyond that, ACUS was concerned with the un-
availability of basic information about agency operations. All of these 
recommendations aim at avoiding secret law, making requirements 
and decisionmaking criteria easier to find, and providing information 
about how agencies actually operate. 
2. Delay and Inefficiency 
In December 1960, former Harvard Law School Dean James Lan-
dis submitted a report to President-elect Kennedy regarding regula-
tory agencies.42 The report reviewed various problems bedeviling 
federal agencies and offered suggestions for fixing them ( one of 
which, importantly, was creation of an administrative conference).43 
In his account of problems to be solved, Landis gave delay pride of 
place, observing that "[i]nordinate delay characterizes the disposition 
of adjudicatory proceedings before substantially all of our regulatory 
agencies."44 Not surprisingly, ACUS's early years reveal a near-obses-
sion with delay. 
Many of the early recommendations flagged the problem of delay 
and offered some remedies. The two most significant of these were 
major proposals, both since widely adopted, for speeding up formal 
adjudications. First, Recommendation 68-6 urged greater delegation 
of final decisional authority to intermediate appellate boards within 
agencies, stressing that not every final decision had to be made by the 
agency itself.45 In the underlying report, James Freedman, drawing on 
Landis, identified delay as one of the "two fundamental problems that 
threaten and often compromise the effectiveness of the administrative 
process."46 Second, Recommendation 70-3 endorsed agency summary 
42 CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE S. COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REP. ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 
(Comm. Print 1960) (report of James McCauley Landis) [hereinafter Landis). 
43 Id. at 74 ("The concept of an Administrative Conference of the United States promises 
more to the improvement of administrative procedures and practices and to the systematization 
of the federal regulatory agencies than anything presently on the horizon."). Prompted by the 
Landis Report, among other things, President Kennedy established a temporary Administrative 
Conference by executive order in April 1961. Exec. Order No. 10,934, 26 Fed. Reg. 3233 (Apr. 
15, 1961). But I do not want to dwell on this early iteration, let alone its 1953-1955 predecessor, 
see Lubbers, supra note 4, at 9 nn.6-10, for fear that someone might suggest we have already 
missed the Conference's fiftieth anniversary. 
44 Landis, supra note 42, at 5. 
45 ACUS Recommendation 68-6, Delegation of Final Decisional Authority Subject to Dis-
cretionary Review by the Agency, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-6 (1993). 
46 James 0. Freedman, Report of the Committee on Agency Organization and Procedure in 
Support of Intermediate Appellate Boards: Subparagraph 1 ( a) of Recommendation No. 6, in REc-
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judgment procedures to avoid unnecessary hearings.47 The underlying 
report, by Ernest Gellhorn, began thus: "Delay is widely acknowl-
edged as a major inadequacy of the administrative process. "48 
Other more focused recommendations aimed at problems of de-
lay included: 
• Recommendation 69-2 urged that National Labor Relations 
Board ("NLRB") orders be made automatically judicially en-
forceable ( as are those of most other independent agencies) so 
that the Board would no longer need to seek affirmative judi-
cial confirmation of its orders.49 The recommendation noted 
that "[t]he present practice burdens the courts with unneces-
sary proceedings whose only product is delay rather than added 
protection against ill-founded action."50 
• Recommendation 69-6 proposed compilation of comprehensive 
statistics regarding agency actions.51 Much of the motivation 
for the recommendation was concern about delay and the need 
to get a handle on the scope of the problem.52 
OMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 125, 125. The second fundamental problem 
was "failure to achieve coherent policy formulation." Id. In the ensuing years, both problems 
came to be seen as having the same solution, at least in part: a shift from adjudication to 
rulemaking as the primary mechanism for policymaking. See infra note 104 and accompanying 
text. But that shift was not yet perceived in 1968-at least, such a perception is not evident in 
the Conference's work product. 
47 ACUS Recommendation 70-3, Summary Decision in Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R. 
§ 305.70-3 (1993). 
48 Ernest Gellhorn, Report of the Committee on Agency Organization and Procedure in 
Support of Recommendation No. 20, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 
545, 545. 
49 ACUS Recommendation 69-2, Judicial Enforcement of Orders of the National Labor 
Relations Board, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-2 (1993). 
50 Id.; see also Admin. Conference of the U.S., Report of the Committee on Judicial Review 
in Support of Recommendation No. IO, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 
238, 238 ("[Precluding the NLRB from issuing automatically enforceable orders] serves no use-
ful purpose but operates to delay the effectiveness of NLRB orders and to impose unnecessary 
costs on the Board."). This recommendation resurrected a recommendation of the 1961-1962 
Administrative Conference; the report accompanying that recommendation is replete with refer-
ences to the delays caused by the existing procedure. See id. at 244, 249-51 , 254-58. 
51 ACUS Recommendation 69-6, Compilation of Statistics on Administrative Proceedings 
by Federal Departments and Agencies, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-6 (1993). 
52 See Staff of the Office of the Chairman, Report of the Committee on Licenses and Au-
thorizations in Support of Recommendation No. 14, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra 
note 26, at 287, 288 ("In particular, the problem of inordinate delays in the administrative pro-
cess demands statistical study."); see also id. at 289 ("The Committee is of the view that time has 
run out for casual efforts to combat inordinate delays in agency proceedings. The Committee 
believes that an intensive and concerted attack upon this persistent problem is long overdue."). 
1228 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1217 
• Recommendation 69-5 urged elimination of duplicative hear-
ings in Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") safety decer-
tification cases.53 
Finally, concerns about delay were also an aspect of the recom-
mendations and reports concerning selection and qualifications of 
hearing examiners (Recommendation 69-9)54 and discovery (Recom-
mendation 70-4).55 
3. Enhancing Public Participation in Agency Proceedings 
A third theme that runs through multiple recommendations is the 
principle that it should be easier for private entities, especially those 
lacking wealth and legal representation, to participate effectively in 
agency proceedings. These recommendations are, of course, the 
purest expressions of the "interest representation" model that was 
taking hold as ACUS began operation.56 Many of the recommenda-
tions having to do with transparency are examples; their implicit pre-
mise was that the reason it should be easier to access the law and learn 
about agency operations was that as things stood no one but the most 
sophisticated insiders could do so.57 These concerns also underlie two 
of the boldest early recommendations. 
The first of these is Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the 
Poor in Agency Rulemaking of Direct Consequence to Them.58 It 
urged federal agencies to undertake affirmative efforts and outreach 
to ensure input from poor people with regard to rulemakings that 
might have a substantial effect on the poor.59 These efforts could in-
clude holding hearings in convenient locations, directly soliciting sub-
missions from representatives of the poor, conducting field surveys of 
53 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U .S., RECOMMENDATION 69-5, ELIMINATION OF DUPLI-
CATIVE HEARINGS IN FAA SAFETY DE-CERTIFICATION CASES 1 (1%9), https://www.acus.gov/ 
recommendation/elimination-duplicative-hearings-faa-safety-de-certification-cases. 
54 ACUS Recommendation 69-9, Recruitment and Selection of Hearing Examiners; Con-
tinuing Training for Government Attorneys and Hearing Examiners; Creation of a Center for 
Continuing Legal Education in Government, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-9 (1988); see Robert E. Park, 
Report of the Committee on Personnel in Support of Recommendation No. 17, in RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 381, 393, 397. 
55 See ACUS Recommendation 70-4: Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R. 
§ 305.70-4 (1988); Edward A. Tomlinson, Report of the Committee on Compliance and Enforce-
ment Proceedings in Support of Recommendation No. 21, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, 
supra note 26, at 577, 578-79, 591, 600-07, 628, 635, 644. 
56 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. 
57 See supra Part II.Al. 
58 ACUS Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaking of 
Direct Consequence to Them, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-5 (1993). 
59 Id. at 57-58. 
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poor people, and setting up advisory committees consisting of repre-
sentatives of poor people.60 When necessary, agencies should directly 
reimburse individuals for expenses or lost wages resulting from partic-
ipating in a rulemaking.61 In its most controversial provision, the rec-
ommendation called on Congress to establish and fund a quasi-
governmental "People's Counsel," the staff of which would "represent 
the interests of the poor in all Federal administrative rulemaking sub-
stantially affecting the poor."62 To modern ears-at least, to this au-
thor's modern ears-the calls for financial support and creation of a 
People's Counsel are among the most anachronistic of the early rec-
ommendations, reflecting a distant, unrecoverable past. 
The People's Counsel idea, with its slightly communist 
resonances, never really caught hold. Funding to support private par-
ticipation in agency proceedings did enjoy some modest success in the 
1970s. Congress authorized certain agencies to provide such pay-
ments, and as many as fourteen agencies adopted some sort of pro-
gram to compensate for the costs of participation.63 But these efforts 
fell by the wayside with the arrival of the Reagan administration and 
have never been resurrected.64 In 1971, ACUS itself backed away a 
little from the idea. In a recommendation directly addressed to en-
hancing public participation in rulemaking, it considered but rejected 
a proposal from the Committee on Agency Organization and Proce-
dure to recommend that agencies actually fund citizen participation.65 
The other relatively bold proposal aimed at enhanced public par-
ticipation was Recommendation 69-8,66 which advocated eliminating 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 58. 
62 Id. at 58-59. This was the only of the first twenty-two recommendations to elicit dis-
senting statements from members of the Conference who disagreed. Six separate statements 
were filed. Most of these objected to the People 's Counsel proposal. See RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 16-20. 
63 For a general overview, see Carl Tobias, Great Expectations and Mismatched Compensa-
tion: Government Sponsored Public Participation in Proceedings of the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101, 1101-09 (1986). 
64 See id. at 1108-09. 
65 See id. at 1104; see also Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceed-
ings, in 2 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. , RECOMMENDATIONS AND R EPORTS OF THE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES at 376, 401 , 406 (1970-1972). Then-ACUS 
Chairman Roger Cramton, on the other hand, was open to the idea. See Roger C. Cramton, The 
Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. 
L.J. 525, 541-46 (1972) (reviewing different possible mechanisms for payment of attorneys' fees 
for members of the public participating in agency proceedings). 
66 ACUS Recommendation 69-8, Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the AP A 
Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1993). 
1230 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW (Vol. 83:1217 
the exemption from the APA's rulemaking requirements for rules re-
garding "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts"67 and 
urged agencies to go through the notice-and-comment process for 
such rules even when not statutorily required to do so.68 This proposal 
did not make much headway in Congress, and this sweeping exemp-
tion remains in place. However, Congress has required some agencies 
that would otherwise fall within the exemption to provide notice and 
comment,69 and many agencies have, as the recommendation urged, 
voluntarily committed to following section 553 rulemaking procedures 
even though they do not have to.70 This recommendation rests on a 
belief in the value of public input in rulemaking. Indeed, the underly-
ing report begins with a lengthy discussion explaining why public par-
ticipation in rulemaking is important.71 
4. Increasing the Availability of Judicial Review 
A final theme is the desire to make judicial review of agency ac-
tion more easily available. Perhaps out of unease about making rec-
ommendations directly to the courts, the Conference did not take on 
the most obvious barrier to review, namely, restrictive standing rules, 
which were in flux at the time.72 But it did address three more techni-
cal barriers. 
First, Recommendation 68-773 urged Congress to eliminate the 
generally applicable amount-in-controversy requirement, then 
67 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2012). 
68 ACUS Recommendation 69-8, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8, at 62. 
69 See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 501(d) (2012) ("The provisions of section 553 of title 5 shall apply, 
without regard to subsection (a)(2) of that section, to matters relating to loans, grants, or bene-
fits under a law administered by the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs]."). 
70 See, e.g., Public Participation in Rulemaking, 36 Fed. Reg. 2532, 2532 (Feb. 5, 1971) 
(referring to the ACUS recommendation and directing all agencies and offices within the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare to follow § 553 requirements even if exempt under 
subsection (a)(2)); Public Participation in Rulemaking, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,804, 13,804 (July 24, 
1971) (instituting the same policy in the Department of Agriculture). In 2013, the Department 
of Agriculture revoked the policy. See Revocation of Statement of Policy on Public Participation 
in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,194, 64,194 (Oct. 28, 2013). For criticism of that change, see 
William Funk, U.S. Department of Agriculture's Revocation of 40+-Year-Old Policy on Engaging 
in Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking, ADMIN. & REo. L. NEws, Winter 2014, at 15, 15-16. 
71 Arthur E. Bonfield, Report of the Committee on Rulemaking in Support of Recommen-
dation No. 16, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 306, 306-09. 
n See Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REv. 1131, 
1151-59 (2009) (describing key federal appellate decisions at this time as simultaneously broad-
ening and narrowing standing for members of the public). 
73 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 68-7, ELIMINATION OF JURIS-
DICTIONAL AMOUNT REQUIREMENT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1968), https://www.acus.gov/recom-
mendation/elimination-jurisdictional-amount-requirement-judicial-review. 
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$10,000,74 for lawsuits against the government and its agents. Second, 
Recommendation 69-1, Statutory Reform of the Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrine, asserted that "[t]he technical legal defense of sovereign im-
munity ... has become in large measure unacceptable" and suggested 
amending the AP A to make clear that sovereign immunity does not 
bar challenges to agency action.75 Third, Recommendation 70-1 
sought to eliminate dismissal of actions against agencies where the 
plaintiff failed to identify the defendant properly; it called on the De-
partment of Justice to draw such defects to the court's attention in 
order to allow the plaintiff to amend its pleadings and on Congress to 
make statutory amendments to liberalize standards for naming gov-
ernment defendants and serving process.76 ACUS's then-Executive 
Director, John Cushman, explained: 
In innumerable cases a citizen's lawsuit against the Govern-
ment has been dismissed solely because the United States or 
one of its agencies was improperly identified in the citizen's 
complaint, or could not be joined as a defendant. Thus, sim-
ply because of virtually inexplicable technical matters, the 
merits of many just claims have not been considered.77 
Cushman's comment went specifically to the rigidity of pleading 
standards in suits against the government, but it captures the general 
sense underlying all three of these recommendations: existing law 
posed pointless technical barriers to access to judicial review of agency 
action.78 
Notably, all three of these recommendations were written into 
law by Congress in 1976.79 They are among the Conference's most 
important contributions. 
74 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (explaining in supplemental notes that this section imposed 
a $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement from 1958 until 1980). 
75 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 69-1, STATUTORY REFORM OF 
THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 1 (1969), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/statu-
tory-reform-sovereign-immunity-doctrine. 
76 ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 70-1, PARTIES DEFENDANT 1-2 
(1970), http://www.acus.gov/recommendation/parties-defendant. 
77 John F. Cushman, Administrative Conference of the United States: Report on the Fourth 
Plenary Session, 22 ADMIN. L. REv. 623, 623 (1970). 
78 One other, more targeted, recommendation probably falls into this category. Recom-
mendation 68-8, Judicial Review of Interstate Commerce Commission Orders, proposed that In-
terstate Commerce Commission cases, which were then sent to a three-judge district court, 
should instead be heard by the Courts of Appeals, as were the decisions of essentially all other 
agencies. ADMIN. CoNFERENCE OF THE U .S. , RECOMMENDATION 68-8, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ORDERS 1 (1968), https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/ 
judicial-review-interstate-commerce-commission-orders. 
79 See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (rewriting§§ 702 and 703 
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B. One Dog That Did Not Bark 
One might also ask what ACUS's initial efforts ignored. By defi-
nition, that is a long list. But one concern loomed large at the time 
and is notably absent, or at least hidden, in these recommendations: 
agency capture. Reviewing the history of capture theory, Thomas 
Merrill identifies 1967 as the starting point of the period in which un-
derstandings of the administrative process, and many efforts to reform 
it, were informed, if not driven, by concerns over capture.80 And cap-
ture was a "major preoccupation"81 of the Landis Report. Landis did 
not use that term, but he did discuss the phenomenon, observing that 
"[i]ndustry orientation of agency members is a common criticism, fre-
quently expressed in terms that the regulatees have become the regu-
lators. "82 Yet nothing in the first three years was explicitly or overtly 
responsive to that concern. Indeed, the only reference to "capture" in 
any of the first twenty-two recommendations and reports appears, un-
expectedly, in Arthur Bonfield's report supporting creation of a "Poor 
People's Counsel."83 Bonfield acknowledged that the folks actually 
employed in such an office would probably themselves be not poor, 
but middle class. He stressed, therefore, that "great pains should be 
taken, and special procedures instituted, to prevent [the staff] from 
being captured or dominated by a middle-class point of view."84 That 
is an interesting sort of regulatory capture, but not the classic concep-
tion of regulatory capture, in which the regulator serves the interests 
of the regulated entity. Moreover, Bonfield did not apply his idea of 
agency capture to a typical ( or even an actual) agency. 
Now the fact that one does not see the term "capture" thrown 
about does not mean that the problem was not on the minds of mem-
to remove the defense of sovereign immunity and to permit a party challenging agency action to 
name the United States, the agency, or the appropriate officer as defendant); id. § 2 (eliminating 
the amount-in-controversy requirement in suits "against the United States, any agency thereof, 
or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity"). 
80 See Merrill, supra note 16, at 1043, 1050. In particular, the late 1960s were a period of 
particular prominence for Ralph Nader, the leading-and, at the time, enormously influential-
diagnoser and decrier of agency capture. See, e.g., EuGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, 
GOING BY THE BooK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 44-45 (1982). 
81 William J . Novak, A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGU· 
LATORY CAPTURE 25, 29 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014). 
82 Landis, supra note 42, at 70. 
83 Arthur E . Bonfield, Report of the Committee on Rulemaking in Support of Recommen-
dation No. 5, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 79, 97, 106 (expressing 
concern that a Poor People's Counsel might be "captured by the ideas and values of the govern-
ment agencies before which it would represent the interests of the poor"). 
84 Id. at 98. 
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bers of the Conference. Many of the recommendations did urge re-
forms that others were promoting as responses to agency capture. In 
particular, capture theorists sought (1) greater and more effective 
public participation in agency processes85 and (2) enhanced judicial 
review of agency action.86 As we have seen, so did ACUS.87 It may be 
that the recommendations along these lines were in fact indirectly re-
sponsive to concerns over capture, though demonstrating whether or 
not that was the case would be challenging indeed. 
It is also possible, however, that the silence regarding capture 
reveals something about ACUS. It is crammed with experts, but most 
work in federal agencies, and many of the others are lawyers who re-
present the firms that, on the traditional theory, have captured the 
agencies.88 These may not be the right people to perceive, or be both-
ered by, capture, if indeed it exists. Alternatively, they are the people 
who would best know whether it does, and they may have concluded 
that it does not. At a minimum, the silence on capture theory seems 
to reflect a kind of politesse. If capture is a problem-a contested 
proposition, of course-ACUS is not likely to be the entity that would 
rise to decry it. 
III. THE SECOND TIME AROUND 
ACUS 2.0 produced its first recommendation, on the subject of 
preemption, in December 2010.89 In the ensuing three years, it pro-
duced twenty-three more as well as one "statement."90 Recommenc-
ing four decades after it had issued the recommendations reviewed 
above, what about ACUS's subjects and recommendations remained 
constant, and what is new? 
85 See, e.g., Lazarus & Onek, supra note 17, at 1074-76, 1092-1106 (decrying the captured 
nature of the independent agencies and urging, among other things, fuller-and agency-
funded-public participation in agency processes as a remedy). 
86 See Merrill, supra note 16, at 1052, 1064-66 (describing the 1970s doctrinal develop-
ments enhancing judicial power at the expense of agency power as resulting from a concern with 
agency pathology in general and capture in particular). 
87 See supra Parts II.A.3-4. 
88 See Assembly, ADMIN. CoNF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov/assembly (last visited Sept. 5, 
2015) (containing biographies of all voting and non-voting members). 
89 ACUS Recommendation 2010-1, Agency Procedures for Considering Preemption of 
State Law, 76 Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 3, 2011). 
90 See Recommendations, ADMIN. CoNF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov/recommendations (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2015) (containing recommendations). 
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A. Four Major Themes Redux 
The fundamental issues with which ACUS grapples are in some 
ways unchanged. At a certain level of generality, transparency, delay, 
and effective public participation remain the three essential themes. 
Enhanced judicial review has largely disappeared, as discussed below. 
But the details have changed. 
1. Transparency 
Categorizing the recent recommendations requires some judg-
ment calls, especially because transparency and public participation 
overlap and some recommendations have elements of both. But one 
plausible breakdown suggests that about a third of these recommen-
dations are about transparency (a term that does now appear, with 
some frequency, in the recommendations and reports). Most promi-
nently, these include: 
• Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments. This recom-
mendation calls on agencies to provide guidance on how to 
submit effective comments, develop and announce clear poli-
cies for anonymous and late-filed comments, and make submit-
ted comments quickly available online.91 
• Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference. This is 
the modem recommendation most directly concerned with the 
"secret law" problem. It seeks to ameliorate, though not elimi-
nate, the burdens involved in commenting on regulatory pro-
posals, and finding actual legal requirements, when agencies' 
proposed or final regulations incorporate by reference material 
that is not freely available, often is copyrighted, and can cost 
hundreds or thousands of dollars to purchase.92 
• Recommendation 2011-7, Federal Advisory Committee Act. 
The Federal Advisory Committee Act ("F ACA")93 is a set of 
transparency provisions seeking to bring sunshine to the agency 
practice of relying on groups of nongovernmental advisors.94 
The recommendation accepts this congressional goal and aims 
to identify measures that would alleviate the Act's procedural 
91 ACUS Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,791, 48,791 
(Aug. 9, 2011). 
92 ACUS Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 
2257-58 (Jan. 17, 2012). 
93 Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2012). 
94 ACUS Recommendation 2011-7, The Federal Advisory Committee Act-Issues and 
Proposed Reforms, 77 Fed. Reg. 2261 , 2261-02 (Jan. 17, 2012). 
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burdens while enhancing transparency and objectivity.95 It is 
alert to the possibility that in this area there can be too much of 
a good thing, though it does not propose any significant rolling 
back of transparency requirements for federal advisory 
committees. 96 
• Recommendation 2013-7 ,97 Government Performance and Re-
sults Act (GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010.98 The recom-
mendation offers guidance to help increase transparency, 
improve information sharing, and facilitate better agency re-
porting under the Government Performance and Results Act,99 
a little-known 1993 law designed to "improve government per-
formance by requiring agencies to set quantifiable performance 
goals and then to assess their performance against their 
goals. "100 
• Recommendation 2012-3, Immigration Removal Adjudication. 
This is a sweeping recommendation touching on many aspects 
of immigration adjudications. But one critical section focuses 
on efforts to compile thorough and accurate data regarding the 
immigration courts' workload and develop and publicize per-
formance metrics.101 
In addition, five separate recommendations involve electronic 
rulemaking.102 While these most obviously belong in the public partic-
95 Id. at 2263-64. 
96 Going outside this Article's self-imposed constraints, a later recommendation regarding 
the Government in the Sunshine Act can be described just the same way-that is, it reflects 
some backlash against transparency requirements but does not propose a major overhaul. See 
ACUS Recommendation 2014-2, Government in the Sunshine Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 35,990, 35,991 
(June 25, 2014). 
97 ACUS Recommendation 2013-7, GPRA Modernization Act of 2010: Examining Con-
straints to, and Providing Tools for, Cross-Agency Collaboration, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,273 (Dec. 17, 
2013). 
98 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Modernization Act, 5 U.S.C. § 306; 
31 u.s.c. §§ 1115-16, 1120-25 (2012). 
99 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 306, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1115-19, 31 U.S.C. §§ 9703-04, 39 U.S.C. 
§§ 2801-05 (2012)). 
100 William Funk, Political Checks on the Administrative Process, in A GumE TO Jumc IAL 
AND POLITICAL REvrnw OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 211,240 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds. , 
2005). 
101 ACUS Recommendation 2012-3, Immigration Removal Adjudication, 77 Fed. Reg. 
47,804, 47,804-05 (Aug. 10, 2012). 
102 See ACUS Recommendation 2011-1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 48,789 (Aug. 9, 2011); ACUS Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 48,791 (Aug. 9, 2011); ACUS Recommendation 2011-8, Agency Innovations in E-Rulemak-
ing, 77 Fed. Reg. 2264 (Jan. 17, 2012); ACUS Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Re-
1236 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1217 
ipation category, each also seeks to ensure the visibility and accessibil-
ity of the rulemaking process and its products. 
Finally, Recommendation 2012-1, Regulatory Analysis, empha-
sizes transparency concerns. It encourages agencies to catalogue and 
publicize generally applicable analysis requirements and, in any given 
rulemaking, to identify explicitly which such requirements apply and 
which do not.103 
2. Delay and Inefficiency 
Concerns over delay still figure prominently in the modem rec-
ommendations, but the issue is no longer the near-obsession it once 
was. This shift surely is not because the battle has been won. Rather, 
it seems more likely that the concern has receded because of the move 
from adjudication to rulemaking.104 In the first twenty-two recom-
mendations, the delays of concern were exclusively those arising in 
adjudications. 105 Delays in the rulemaking process were not on any-
one's radar. The more recent suite of recommendations remains con-
cerned about delays in adjudications. Thus, Recommendation 2011-4, 
regarding video hearings, is directed at agencies with high-volume 
caseloads, urging them to consider videoconferencing as a way of im-
proving efficiency or reducing costs.106 Similarly, Recommendation 
2012-3, regarding immigration removal adjudications, begins by noting 
that "[o]ne of the biggest challenges identified in the adjudication of 
immigration removal cases is the backlog of pending proceedings and 
the limited resources to deal with the caseload."107 Much of the rec-
ommendation is directed at understanding and reducing the backlog 
and delays that characterize the present system.108 Thus, ACUS 2.0 
has addressed the most prominent aspects of delay in contemporary 
adj udications.109 
cord in Informal Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 41 ,358 (July 10, 2013); ACUS Recommendation 
2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269 (Dec. 17, 2013). 
103 ACUS Recommendation 2012-1 , Regulatory Analysis Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 
47,801 , 47,801-02 (Aug. 10, 2012). 
104 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 
TuLSA L.J. 185, 188-90 (1996) (discussing the rise of agency rulemaking in the 1960s and 1970s). 
105 See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text (discussing ACUS's early recommenda-
tions aimed at eliminating delays). 
106 ACUS Recommendation 2011-4, Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best Practices and 
Possibilities for Expansion, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,795, 48,796 (Aug. 9, 2011). 
107 ACUS Recommendation 2012-3, Immigration Removal Adjudication, 77 Fed. Reg. 
47,804, 47,804 (Aug. 10, 2012) 
108 Id. at 47,804-08. 
109 Two other recommendations address inefficiencies in other aspects of the administrative 
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Delay and inefficiency in the rulemaking process have also re-
ceived some attention. The two most important instances are Recom-
mendation 2012-1, concerning regulatory analysis,110 and Statement 
18, concerning OIRA review of regulations.111 The first of these does 
acknowledge the burdens imposed by the multiple analytic require-
ments that apply to agency rulemakings,112 often labeled (though not 
by ACUS) "paralysis by analysis." 113 But it is careful not to take a 
position on whether existing requirements are excessive.114 Nor does 
it state that further analytic requirements should not be imposed. 115 
Rather, it urges streamlining existing requirements to the extent possi-
ble, particularly by being alert to the possibility that overlapping re-
quirements could be consolidated.116 Similarly, Statement 18 
expresses concern that OIRA review simply takes too long, delaying 
the rulemaking process, but it stops short of a formal recommendation 
process. See ACUS Recommendation 2012-4, Paperwork Reduction Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,808, 
47,808-10 (Aug. 10, 2012) (suggesting ways to streamline the process for approval of information 
collection requests); ACUS Recommendation 2011-6, International Regulatory Cooperation, 77 
Fed. Reg. 2259, 2260 (Jan. 17, 2012) (suggesting ways in which agencies could more efficiently 
join forces with their foreign counterparts). 
110 ACUS Recommendation 2012-1, Regulatory Analysis Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 
47,801 (Aug. 10, 2012). 
111 ACUS Statement# 18, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013). 
112 ACUS Recommendation 2012-1, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,801-02. 
113 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform, 25 YALE J. 
ON REG. 85, 89 (2008) ('" Paralysis by analysis' has become a cliche in regulatory circles today."). 
114 "Although the Conference seeks to assure that existing analytic requirements are ap-
plied in the most efficient and transparent manner possible, it does not address whether the 
number or nature of those requirements might not be reduced in light of their cumulative impact 
on agencies." ACUS Recommendation 2012-1, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,801. As per the request for 
proposals, see Megan Kindelan, ACUS Announces 2 New RFPs: PRA and Regulatory Analysis, 
AoMIN. CoNF. U.S. (Aug. 4, 2011, 1:42 PM), http://www.acus.gov/newsroom/administrative-fix-
blog/acus-announces-2-new-rfps-pra-and-regulatory-analysis ("The study should assess whether 
or not the analysis requirements have caused an ossification of the rulemaking process."), the 
underlying report devoted considerable attention to the ossification of the rulemaking process, 
see CURTIS w. COPELAND, REGULATORY ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS: A REVIEW AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR REFORM 66--74 (2012). However, the committee producing the recommenda-
tion decided to leave any discussion of ossification out of the final recommendation. See COMM. 
ON REGULATION, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MINUTES: MAY 3, 2012, at 2 (2012), https:// 
www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Draft-Meeting-Minutes-5.03.2012-revised.pdf. 
115 See ACUS Recommendation 2012-1, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,801. An older recommendation 
was more forceful: "Congress should reconsider the need for continuing statutory analytical re-
quirements that necessitate broadly applicable analyses or action to address narrowly-focused 
issues." ACUS Recommendation 93-4, Improving the Environment for Agency Rulemaking, 59 
Fed. Reg. 4670, 4673 (Feb. 1, 1994), corrected at 59 Fed. Reg. 8507 (Feb. 22, 1994). 
116 ACUS Recommendation 2012-1 , 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,801-02. 
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and does not in any way call into question the value of OIRA 
review.117 
These three forays into the problem of rulemaking delays are 
meaningful, but amount to less than one might have expected. After 
all, recent decades have seen much wailing and gnashing of teeth re-
garding the "ossification" of the rulemaking process.118 The ossifica-
tion theme has been so pronounced, and ACUS's core mission so 
focused on addressing delay and inefficiency, that it is somewhat sur-
prising that ACUS 2.0 has not pursued the issue of delay and ineffi-
ciency in rulemaking as aggressively as ACUS 1.0 went after those 
problems in adjudication. 
Three possible explanations come to mind. One is simply that 
twenty years ago ACUS did issue a recommendation aimed at reduc-
ing rulemaking ossification.119 It may just not have much more to say 
on the matter. 
Second, the ossification thesis is not universally accepted. 
Though compelling, it is more anecdotal than data-driven, and several 
recent empirical studies have suggested that it is overblown.120 If in-
deed the rulemaking process is humming along efficiently, then that 
would explain why ACUS has not addressed delays therein. This ex-
planation is unconvincing, however. For one thing, there is just no 
getting around the fact that the rulemaking process is enormously bur-
densome and time-consuming; the fact that it has not ground to a halt 
does not mean that there are not opportunities to speed it up. In any 
event, most observers (including most members of ACUS, one would 
assume) in fact accept the ossification thesis, 121 notwithstanding the 
mixed empirical studies. 
The third explanation is that it is not clear that there is a consen-
sus within ACUS, or within Washington, or among informed observ-
ers generally, in favor of an efficient and speedy rulemaking process. 
117 ACUS Statement# 18, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013). 
118 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Pro-
cess, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1385-96 (1992). 
119 See Recommendation 93-4, supra note 115. 
120 See Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of 
the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REv. 889, 936 (2008) (suggesting that volume of 
agency rulemaking shows it is not ossified); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing 
the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 
1950-1990, 80 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1414, 1475 (2012). But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr. , Rulemaking 
Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1493, 
1493-98, 1502-03 (2012). 
121 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 120, at 1493, 1498; Yackee & Yackee, supra note 120, at 
1418-19. 
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It is hard to be in favor of delays in adjudication as a systemic matter. 
Of course, as between the parties to an adjudication, delay will often 
favor at least one of them. But as a systemic matter, that benefit will 
generally be precisely offset by the disadvantage to the other party. 
Moreover, adjudication resolves legal rights; the systemic interest 
would be in clarifying legal rights rather than having lingering uncer-
tainty. There is no legitimate interest in-and much human and eco-
nomic cost to-delaying the resolution of legal rights beyond the time 
necessary to do the job properly. But rulemaking is different. 
Rulemaking generally involves the establishment of new legal require-
ments.122 Accordingly, those who are dubious about the value of new 
regulations may systemically value an inefficient rulemaking process. 
Exactly this justification has been offered in favor of the difficult pro-
cess for enacting legislation under the U.S. Constitution.123 And a 
longstanding argument in favor of a nondelegation doctrine with teeth 
is that we should be concerned about having too much law,124 and that 
allowing delegations to agencies will result in more law precisely be-
cause it is easier for agencies to write regulations than it is for Con-
gress to enact laws.125 The near-complete partisan division over 
legislative proposals to expand the APA's rulemaking requirements126 
seems to confirm this assessment. 
In short, ACUS's tendency to steer away from the ossification 
issue reflects something new, important, and disheartening about the 
field of administrative law. Disagreements over regulatory substance 
are affecting debates over rulemaking procedure in a way that is new 
( and does not infect debates over adjudicatory procedure). One 
would imagine people who thought agencies should issue lots of regu-
lations and people who thought they should issue almost none could 
122 "Generally," because rulemaking can of course also involve the elimination or dilution 
of regulatory requirements. 
123 See, e.g. , John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 CoLUM. L. REV. 
1, 72-73 (2001). 
124 See Mila Sohoni, The Idea of "Too Much Law," 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 1585, 1612 
(2012). 
125 See, e.g., Environmental Regulations, the Economy, and Jobs: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Env't & Econ. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 44 (2011) 
(statement of Christopher DeMuth, D.C. Searle Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research) ("Regulatory delegation ... has permitted the Congress to accom-
modate the never-ending political demands for government intervention to a far greater degree 
than legislation alone could have accomplished . . .. The size, scope, reticulation, and minuteness 
of the modern 'nanny state' is an artifact of regulatory delegation: it could not have been 
achieved and it could not be managed through direct legislation."). 
126 See, e.g. , H.R. REP. No. 113-237, at 17-18 (2013); 157 CoNo. REC. H8105 (daily ed. Dec. 
2, 2011) (vote on Regulatory Accountability Act). 
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still agree on a sensible process for producing those regulations. 127 At 
present, that does not seem to be the case. 
3. Enhancing Public Participation in Agency Proceedings 
The importance of ensuring that rulemaking is open to effective 
participation by all members of the public remains a recurrent con-
cern in the more recent round of recommendations. It is very much at 
the heart of the five recommendations regarding e-rulemaking.128 At 
the same time, ther.e has been a meaningful shift. The first set of rec-
ommendations was concerned with ensuring that representatives of af-
fected interests could meaningfully participate. The most obvious 
example is the 1968 recommendation regarding the need to ensure 
adequate representation of the interests -of poor people in rulemak-
ing.129 It was an instantiation of the interest representation model of 
the "reformed" administrative law. That meant, in part, the abandon-
ment of a model in which there was such a thing as "the public inter-
est" as opposed to the sum of various particular interests.13° Indeed, 
one of the dissenting statements regarding the proposal objected to it 
on exactly this ground: "I consider unsound attempts to fractionate 
the public interest which is properly the concern of our Federal ad-
ministrative agencies: "131 
In the modern era, the "public interest" remains elusive. But the 
interest representation model has itself crumbled. Two alternatives 
vie to replace it. One, discussed below, is the idea of presidential con-
trol.132 A second involves direct citizen engagement. Much of the 
most optimistic writing about new technologies and governance as-
sumes that individuals will be able to participate directly, not through 
representatives.133 Whether that might in fact happen very much re-
127 Members of the Administrative Conference did exactly that in an important recommen-
dation from the early 1990s. See ACUS Recommendation 93-4, Improving the Environment for 
Agency Rulemaking, 59 Fed. Reg. 4670 (Feb. 1, 1994). 
12s See supra note 102. 
129 ACUS Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaking of 
Direct Consequence to Them, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-5 (1993). 
130 See supra Part 11.A.3. 
131 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 20 (dissenting statement of Rob-
ert W. Graham opposing Recommendation 68-5). 
132 See infra Part III .B. 7. 
133 See, e.g., John M. de Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal 
Communications Commission, 55 DUKE L.J. 969, 975 (2006) (describing the view that e-rulemak-
ing will enable individual participation and so "enhance[ ] the democratic process in rulemaking 
which, in turn, increases bureaucratic legitimacy and federal government credibility, strengthens 
individual autonomy and rights of self-governance, increases public understanding of rulemak-
ing, and enhances the accountability of administrative agencies to other branches of govern-
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mains to be seen. ACUS's recommendations have been somewhat ag-
nostic on the question. The recent recommendations, however, are 
more open to the idea of direct participation by affected interests and 
do not focus much on adequate representation of particular interests. 
4. Judicial Review 
Of the four primary themes of the first set of recommendations, 
judicial review is the one that has largely disappeared from the mod-
ern counterparts. Only three recommendations concern judicial re-
view, and each addresses an issue that is relatively narrow and 
technical. Recommendation 2013-6 explores the contours of the 
courts' occasional, and contested, practice of remanding a defective 
agency action without setting that action aside.134 Recommendation 
2013-4 offers suggestions regarding how agencies should compile, and 
what should be included in, the "record" in an informal rulemaking.135 
Finally, Recommendation 2012-6 suggests a statutory amendment to a 
technical provision regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal 
Claims.136 
Issues of judicial review remain, and will always be, central to the 
overall administrative law regime. ACUS will always have a judicial 
review committee. But of the four primary themes of the early years, 
this is the one that seems most dilute in the contemporary counter-
parts. Not only are there only three recommendations from the judi-
cial review committee, but none concerns what was the focus of the 
judicial recommendations by ACUS 1.0-expanding the availability of 
judicial review. Presumably, this shift reflects (1) the fact that, in part 
thanks to ACUS, the availability of judicial review has been expanded 
since the 1960s, and (2) some loss of enthusiasm for the benefits of 
judicial review for the administrative process since the pre-Vermont 
ment") (citations omitted); Beth Simone Noveck, Evolving Democracy for the 21st Century 6-8, 
http://cairns.typepad.com/files/evolving-democracy.pdf (paper prepared for the Club de Madrid 
2011 Annual Conference, Nov. 8-9, 2011, New York City) (imagining broad, direct public input 
into legislation). 
134 ACUS Recommendation 2013-6, Remand Without Vacatur, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,272 (Dec. 
17, 2013). 
135 ACUS Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking, 
78 Fed. Reg. 41 ,358 (July 10, 2013). ACUS members in the early years would have been per-
plexed by this topic, which would have struck them as involving an oxymoron. It is a sign of how 
modern understandings of the nature of informal rulemaking, and the review of informal 
rulemaking, have developed that there could be a recommendation on this topic at all. 
136 ACUS Recommendation 2012-6, Reform of 28 U.S.C. Section 1500, 78 Fed. Reg. 2939, 
2940-41 (Jan. 15, 2013). 
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Yankee137 days of an extremely muscular judicial role, particularly in 
the D.C. Circuit. 
B. Brave New World 
The previous section emphasized the common themes between 
our two time periods. That commonality is real, and at a high level of 
generality these basic concerns-transparency, efficiency, participa-
tion, and appropriate judicial review-seem perpetual, central issues 
of the administrative state. But, as we saw, this description hides 
some equally important changes regarding the specifics. In addition, 
new themes have developed and new issues arisen that were not even 
a gleam in ACUS's eye in the late 1960s. This section turns to those 
issues. 
1. Technology 
The biggest single transformation in agency operations between 
1968 and 2010 has resulted from the rise of the personal computer and 
related technologies, especially the Internet. In ACUS's first three 
years, not a single recommendation involved new technological pos-
sibilities. Indeed, from a technological point of view, there is little if 
anything in these recommendations that could not have been pro-
duced in the years 1868 to llflO. The recommendations make no men-
tion-none-of computers.138 
The same year the Administrative Conference Act was signed 
into law, IBM's most compelling and popular exhibit at the New York 
World's Fair was the selectric typewriter.139 Inklings of the technologi-
137 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc. , 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (bringing to a halt 
lower courts' tendency to impose on agencies judge-made procedural requirements that lacked a 
firm statutory or constitutional foundation) . 
138 There is one such mention in one of the underlying reports. The report regarding Rec-
ommendation 69-6, regarding the compilation of statistics, notes, somewhat quaintly: 
In the past, statistical study has been laborious. Today, every agency has its own 
computer facilities or, at nominal expense, can arrange for the use of the facilities 
of some other agency. The Committee is confident that, with such capability, 
[agencies will improve regulatory outcomes through] continuing statistical study of 
administrative procedures . . .. 
Staff of the Office of the Chairman, Report of the Committee on Licenses and Authorizations in 
Support of Recommendation No. 14, in RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 26, at 
287,295. 
139 See ROBERT W. RYDELL ET AL., FAIR AMERICA 107-09 (2000) (reproducing photo-
graph of IBM pavilion designed to mimic type ball from selectric typewriter and noting that 1964 
World's Fair attendees enjoyed IBM's "state-of-the-art exhibit[]"); International Business Ma-
chines, NEw YoRK WoRLD's FAIR 1964/1965, http://www.nywf64.com/ibm02.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2015) (describing significance of design). 
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cal revolution to come were present during ACUS l.0's run, but the 
real transformation occurred precisely during the decade and a half 
that ACUS had left the scene. So perhaps the largest divergence be-
tween the old recommendations and the new ones is that most of the 
latter assume the existence of, and rely on, the Internet and agency 
websites. That is hardly a surprise, but reviewing the old recommen-
dations does remind us of just how thoroughly new technologies have 
transformed how agencies go about their business. 
One way of seeing this change is by matching up certain old rec-
ommendations with their ACUS 2.0 equivalents. For example, the 
very first recommendation, 68-1, concerned the adequacy of agency 
hearing facilities, stressing the need for more hearing rooms and space 
that was both functional and, in a word, classier.140 The counterpart 
among the new recommendations would be 2011-4, Agency Use of 
Video Hearings. 141 Both are concerned with ensuring that the agency 
has available a functional and sufficient "place" in which to conduct 
adjudications.142 In 1968, that meant improving physical facilities; in 
2011, it meant creation of virtual spaces through technology. Simi-
larly, the recommendation on ensuring adequate representation of the 
poor in rulemaking proceedings has a contemporary counterpart in 
the several recommendations regarding e-rulemaking, which generally 
have the goal of increasing the visibility of rulemakings, reducing the 
cost of participating therein, and making agencies directly accessible 
to individuals.143 
The scope of this profound technological change is also made ap-
parent by identifying recommendations that are simply obsolete be-
cause of technological developments. That category would seem to 
include most of the recommendations having to do with getting infor-
mation-indexes for the CFR, the parallel table of statutory authori-
ties and regulatory provisions, the Consumer Bulletin, and the 
improved Government Manual (the Manual still exists, but its func-
tion has largely been overtaken by agency websites). 144 Thus, the Par-
140 ACUS Recommendation 68-1, Adequate Hearing Facilities, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-1 (1988). 
141 ACUS Recommendation 2011-4, Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best Practices and 
Possibilities for Expansion, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,795, 48,796 (Aug. 9, 2011). 
142 Compare ACUS Recommendation 68-1 , 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-1, at 52 ("Administrative 
hearings of the Federal Government should be conducted in dignified, efficient hearing rooms, 
appropriate as to size, arrangement, and furnishings."), with ACUS Recommendation 2011-4, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 48,795-96 (advising agencies to consider conducting hearings via videoconference 
because of the flexibility, efficiency, and cost savings that this technology offers). 
143 See supra notes 102, 129, and accompanying text. The shift here is not just technologi-
cal. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra Part 11.A.l. 
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allel Table addressed in Recommendation 68-3 is still produced, 
published in the Index and Finding Aids volume of the CFR-and, 
more relevant for most people, available online.145 But it is a fairly 
obsolete finding aid; most researchers would find this information far 
more quickly with an online search. And if one does it that way, 
whether the official Table is accurate simply does not matter. The 
middleman is omitted; in essence the searcher herself does what this 
recommendation asked the agency to do. 
Yet a third way of demonstrating the central importance of tech-
nological developments is simply to identify the number of ACUS rec-
ommendations that specifically address how agencies might or should 
employ new technologies. Not counting recommendations that make 
a passing reference to, say, the need to post something on the agency 
website, these include 'at least the following: Recommendation 2011-1 
(legal considerations in e-rulemaking),146 Recommendation 2011-2 
(rulemaking comments),147 Recommendation 2011-4 (video hear-
ings),148 Recommendation 2011-8 (innovations in e-rulemaking),149 
Recommendation 2013-4 (rulemaking record),150 and Recommenda-
tion 2013-5 (social media in rulemaking).151 
2. Progress 
Stressing the thematic congruence leaves one with the impression 
that the administrative process is stuck in place, going round the same 
track over and over. In some respects, that is no doubt the case. But 
it is indisputable that enormous gains have been made on at least two 
fronts, thanks largely to the move online: the opportunities for public 
participation in rulemaking and the availability of agency materials 
and information about agency operations have massively increased. 
Consider one example. Recommendation 2011-5 addresses the phe-
145 See Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, C.F.R. INDEX 833 (2014), http://www.gpo 
.gov/help/parallel_table.pdf. 
146 ACUS Recommendation 2011-1 , Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 
48,789 (Aug. 9, 2011). 
147 ACUS Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,791 (Aug. 9, 
2011). 
148 ACUS Recommendation 2011-4, Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best Practices and 
Possibilities for Expansion, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,795 (Aug. 9, 2011). 
149 ACUS Recommendation 2011-8, Agency Innovations in E-Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. 
2264 (Jan. 17, 2012). 
150 ACUS Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking, 
78 Fed. Reg. 41,358 (July 10, 2013). 
151 ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269 
(Dec. 17, 2013). 
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nomenon of incorporation by reference.152 The problem here arises 
when agencies reference privately developed standards in regulations 
but do not reprint them.153 These standards are often copyrighted, can 
be difficult to find, and may require purchase for hundreds or 
thousands of dollars if someone wants to actually see them.154 At the 
proposed rule stage, this interferes with the opportunity to comment; 
at the final rule stage, it interferes with the ability to comply. Without 
wading into the merits of ACUS's proposal and the debates it has en-
gendered,155 suffice it to say that the fact that this has generated con-
troversy at all is a sign of a significant shift since the era of ACUS's 
first twenty-two recommendations. Private standards are relatively 
hard to find and expensive, given that publicly created law is now 
available to everyone, for free, on the Internet. But they are not re-
ally harder to obtain than publicly created law once was. In 1968, 
reading a regulation required a trip to the library or an expensive 
purchase of a hard copy of the CFR. Commenting on a proposed rule 
also required a trip to the library or an expensive subscription, this 
time in order to obtain the Federal Register. The reason that the diffi-
culty of viewing incorporated private standards has become so salient 
is not that it is harder than it used to be; it is that everything else has 
become so much easier.156 Whatever the merits of this particular de-
bate, the huge strides in the availability of law generally should be 
celebrated. 
3. The Shift from Adjudication to Rulemaking 
Historically, agencies relied on adjudication for policy formula-
tion.157 The 1970s saw a fundamental shift toward rulemaking as the 
primary tool for agency policy formulation. The shift was starting but 
not yet in full swing when ACUS began operations.158 In the following 
152 ACUS Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257 (Jan. 
17, 2012). 
153 Id. at 2257-58. 
154 See id. at 2258; Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the Law: The Per-
plexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MIC H . L. R E V. 737, 737, 751-52 (2014). 
155 Two invaluable discussions are ACUS staff attorney Emily Bremer's report, later pub-
lished as Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government A ge, 36 HARV. 
J.L. & Pus. Po L'Y 131, 150-53 (2013), and Mendelson, supra note 154. 
156 See Bremer, supra note 155, at 152-53. 
157 See Pierce, supra note 104, at 188. 
158 For example, the Federal Trade Commission proposed its first trade regulation rule, 
regarding the labeling of cigarettes, in 1964. Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of 
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (July 2, 1964). It 
bad issued only a handful of others, and its authority to do so remained contested, when, in 1969, 
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decades, the shift became complete. Since most agencies now make 
most of their important decisions through rulemaking (the NLRB re-
mains an outlier159), it is hardly a surprise that ACUS too has shifted 
its focus. In ACUS 1.0, nine or more of the twenty-two recommenda-
tions were specific to adjudication; eight if one does not count the 
recommendation concerning hearing examiners, who could, after all, 
conceivably preside over a formal rulemaking.160 Only four were spe-
cific to rulemaking161 and the remainder were relevant to both. As 
one would expect, the ratio flips in the more recent twenty-five rec-
ommendations: eleven are specific to rulemaking162 and only three or 
four are specific to adjudication.163 
it proposed requiring gas stations to post the octane level of the gasoline they were selling. 
Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,449 (July 30, 1969). The rule was issued in final 
form in 1971, Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers on Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 36 Fed. 
Reg. 23,871 (Dec. 16, 1971), and upheld by the D.C. Circuit two years later in the well-known 
case of National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC. 482 F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
159 See Zev J . Eigen & Sandro Garofalo, Less Is More: A Case for Structural Reform of the 
National Labor Relations Board, 98 MINN. L. REv. 1879, 1884-85 (2014). 
160 These were Recommendations 68-1 (adequate hearing facilities), 68-6 (delegation of 
final decisionmaking authority), 69-5 (duplicative FAA safety hearings), 69-7 (consideration of 
alternatives in licensing), 69-9 (recruitment and training of hearing examiners), 70-2 (SEC no-
action letters), 70-3 (summary decisions in formal adjudication), 70-4 (discovery in formal adju-
dication), and 70-5 (guidance regarding Renegotiation Board determinations). In addition, two 
recommendations concerned judicial review and enforcement of agency orders-68-8 (review of 
ICC orders) and 69-2 (enforcement of NLRB orders). See Recommendations (1968-1995), Ao. 
MIN. CoNF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov/recommendations/historical-recommendations-1%8-1995 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2015). 
161 These were Recommendations 68-3 (parallel statement of statutory authorities and 
rules), 68-5 (representation of the poor in rulemaking proceedings), 69-4 (CFR indexes), and 69-
8 (elimination of exemption from notice-and-comment requirement) . See id. 
162 These were Recommendations 2010-1 (preemption), 2011-1 (legal considerations in e-
rulemaking), 2011-2 (rulemaking comments), 2011-5 (incorporation by reference in regulations), 
2011-8 (e-rulemaking), 2012-1 (regulatory analysis requirements), 2012-2 (midnight rules), 2013-
2 (benefit-cost analysis in independent agency rulemakings), 2013-4 (the record in informal 
rulemaking), and 2013-5 (use of social media in rulemaking), as well as Statement# 18 (timeli-
ness of OIRA regulatory review). See Recommendations (2010-Present), ADMIN. CoNF. U.S., 
http://www.acus.gov/recommendations/current-recommendations-2010-present (last visited Sept. 
5, 2015). 
163 These were Recommendations 2011-4 (video hearings) , 2012-3 (immigration removal 
adjudication), 2012-8 (inflation adjustments for civil penalties), and 2013-1 (consistency in social 
security adjudications). In fact , in recent years the Conference has devoted more attention to 
adjudication than this tally implies. In particular, the Social Security Administration has com-
missioned a number of projects. See generally Gerald K. Ray & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Govern-
ment Success Story: How Data Analysis by the Social Security Appeals Council (with a Push from 
the Administrative Conference of the United States) Is Transforming Social Security Disability 
Adjudication, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1575 (2015). The general point-that the move to 
rulemaking as the preferred, and almost exclusive, tool for policymaking is reflected in the Con-
ference 's output-stands, however. 
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4. The Shift in Specific Agencies 
The recommendations and reports from ACUS 1.0 are populated 
by ghosts. The late and sometimes lamented Interstate Commerce 
Commission and the Renegotiation Board were each the subject of a 
specific recommendation.164 Other agencies that received significant 
attention, such as the NLRB, the SEC, and the FAA, while still im-
portant, do not loom as large as they once did. Absent from the first 
set of recommendations, of course, are the whole range of agencies 
created since 1970 with jurisdiction over health, safety, consumer pro-
tection, and the environment. Recommendation 68-4 hints at the con-
sumer-protection movement, endorsing the idea of a "consumer 
bulletin,"165 but the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau did not yet exist.166 Not to 
mention three 600-pound gorillas created in 1970: the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration,167 the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration,168 and, perhaps most important, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA"). President Nixon created the 
EPA through an Executive Order, Reorganization Plan No. 3,169 
which was submitted to Congress on July 9, 1970. ACUS's fourth ple-
nary session, the last to be considered in this survey, had taken place 
just five weeks earlier, on June 2nd and 3rd.170 Little did they know. 
5. The Shift in Regulatory Missions and Agendas 
Behind the change in particular agencies lies a more fundamental 
change in the nature of regulation. ACUS came into being when 
traditional economic regulation still dominated federal agency activ-
ity. Over the course of the following decade, Congress, with strong 
bipartisan support, moved decisively away from regulating prices and 
164 RECOMMENDATION 68-8, supra note 78 (judicial review of Interstate Commerce Com-
mission orders); RECOMMENDATION 70-5, supra note 41 (practices and procedures of the Rene-
gotiation Board). 
165 RECOMMENDATION 68-4, supra note 35, at 1. 
166 See Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207, 1210 (1972) (estab-
lishing the Consumer Product Safety Commission); Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 5, 2015) (noting that Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 
2010). 
167 See All About OSHA, OccuPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.osha 
.gov/Publications/3302-06N-2006-English.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2015). 
168 See Highway Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1713, 1739. 
169 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970). 
170 See Historical Timeline, ADMIN. CoNF. U.S., https://www.acus.gov/50/timeline/1970%20-
%201979 (last visited Sept. 5, 2015). 
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market entry and toward regulating externalities. These substantive 
shifts are not on the surface of any of the ACUS recommendations, 
but they are lurking in the background. 
6. Increasing Attention to the Problem of "Silos" 
The first twenty-two ACUS recommendations treat agencies as 
freestanding entities. Several address the internal operations of agen-
cies, but none addresses, or even seems aware of, issues regarding the 
relationships among agencies, or between agencies and the White 
House or other regulatory actors, including private parties who are 
working with or for the agency. This silence cannot possibly be attrib-
uted to an inherent blind spot.171 To the contrary, this is just the sort 
of issue to which one would expect both the public and the govern-
mental members of ACUS to be acutely alert. 
In contrast, the latter group of recommendations reflects a keen 
awareness that agencies operate in a complex world. Almost a third 
fit this description, including the recommendations that address pre-
emption (i.e., the relationship between federal and state regulators),172 
the ethical obligations of government contractors,173 federal advisory 
committees,174 the use of third parties to determine whether regulated 
entities are in compliance,175 international regulatory cooperation,176 
coordination and cooperation among agencies with overlapping re-
sponsibilities, 177 and regulatory review by OIRA.178 
The explanation for this shift is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Three factors may be at work. First, as the federal government contin-
ues to increase in complexity and scope, with multiple agencies pos-
171 Cf supra Part III.B (suggesting that ACUS's failure to discuss agency capture may be 
attributable to a blind spot). 
172 Recommendation 2010-1 , supra note 89. 
173 ACUS Recommendation 2011-3, Compliance Standards for Government Contractor 
Employees-Personal Conflicts of Interest and Use of Certain Non-Public Information, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 48,792 (Aug. 9, 2011). 
174 ACUS Recommendation 2011-7, The Federal Advisory Committee Act-Issues and 
Proposed Reforms, 77 Fed. Reg. 2261 (Jan. 17, 2012). 
175 ACUS Recommendation 2012-7, Agency Use of Third-Party Programs to Assess Regu-
latory Compliance, 78 Fed. Reg. 2941 (Jan. 15, 2013). 
176 ACUS Recommendation 2011-6, International Regulatory Cooperation, 77 Fed. Reg. 
2259 (Jan. 17, 2012). 
177 See ACUS Recommendation 2012-5, Improving Coordination of Related Agency Re-
sponsibilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,810 (Aug. 10, 2012); ACUS Recommendation 2013-7, GPRA 
Modernization Act of 2010: Examining Constraints to, and Providing Tools for, Cross-Agency 
Collaboration, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,273 (Dec. 17, 2013). 
178 ACUS Statement# 18, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013). 
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sessing overlapping responsibilities,179 the silo effect and related issues 
have become more salient and inescapable. Second, technological 
changes have made the silo effect particularly problematic in settings 
where information systems cannot communicate with each other. In-
deed, this is the most familiar use of the term, as in "information si-
los."180 It could be that the government's information silo problem, 
and these technological challenges generally, have sensitized observ-
ers to corresponding problems outside the information technology set-
ting. Third-and this is a central point of this article-ACUS is 
inescapably subject to the intellectual currents of the world in which it 
operates. For whatever reason, agency interactions have become a fo-
cus of academics and government officials alike in recent years.181 Ac-
cordingly, it is hardly a surprise to see these issues appear in ACUS's 
recommendations. 
7. Presidential Management 
As mentioned in Part 11,182 ACUS's early years preceded the 
"counter-reformation" and its emphasis on presidential oversight. 
The President is quite invisible in the first twenty-two recommenda-
tions. Indeed, executive-as opposed to independent-agencies are 
relatively hidden; the independent regulatory commissions over-
shadow them. In the modern counterparts, that has changed. Presi-
dential oversight generally, and regulatory review in particular, are 
taken as given; ACUS's goal is not to rethink these phenomena but 
rather to make such supervision as efficient and useful as possible.183 
179 See generally Michael Doran, Legislative Organization and Administrative Redundancy, 
91 B.U . L. REV. 1815 (2011). 
180 See Stacy A. Baird, Government Role and the Interoperability Ecosystem, 5 1/S: J.L. & 
P OL'Y FOR I N FO. Soc'v 219, 243-45 (2009). 
181 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, A gency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in 
Administrative Law, 2006 Su P. CT. REv. 201; Jason Marisam, Interagency Administration, 45 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183 (2013). 
182 See supra Part IL 
183 See ACUS Recommendation 2012-1, Regulatory Analysis Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 
47,801 (Aug. 10, 2012); ACUS Recommendation 2013-2, Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent 
Regulatory Agencies, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,355 (July 10, 2013); ACUS Statement# 18, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
76,275. Another modern recommendation that reflects the new presidentialism is Recommenda-
tion 2012-2, Midnight Rules. ACUS Recommendation 2012-2, Midnight Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. 
47,802 (Aug. 10, 2012). 
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CONCLUSION: 
THE CONTINUING "REFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW" 
Richard Stewart's The Reformation of American Administrative 
Law184 appeared in 1975. The reformation Professor Stewart identi-
fied was underway but not yet complete when ACUS got to work. 
Several of ACUS's early projects reflect the reformation; Recommen-
dation 68-5,185 regarding the representation of the poor in rulemaking, 
is the purest example. But administrative law continued and contin-
ues to be reformed; the interest representation model no longer domi-
nates, either descriptively or normatively. And just as the 
transformations that Stewart described can be seen in the early ACUS 
projects, so the transformations that have taken place since then can 
be seen in the projects that the new ACUS has undertaken. Among 
these changes, the rise of new technologies looms largest. If the ad-
ministrative state is truly being refashioned by the new technologies, 
not only will we see it in ACUS's recommendations, but those recom-
mendations will themselves help shape and define the new era, as they 
have for half a century. 
184 Stewart, supra note 6. 
185 ACUS Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaking of 
Direct Consequence to Them, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-5 (1993). 
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APPENDIX A 
Recommendations from ACUS's First First Three Years 
1. Recommendation 68-1, Adequate Hearing Facilities,186 urges 
the General Services Administration to maintain an inventory of ad-
ministrative hearing facilities, develop hearing spaces suitable to the 
seriousness of an adjudicatory proceeding, and coordinate with the 
federal and state judiciaries concerning the possibility of using judicial 
courtrooms for administrative hearings. 
2. Recommendation 68-2, U.S. Government Organization Man-
ual,187 points out that the agency-specific descriptions included in the 
Manual are often "outdated, unrevealing, cumbersome, or otherwise 
deficient. "188 It urges each agency required to submit information on 
its organization and functions for publication in the Manual under 5 
U.S.C. § 552, to assign the drafting task to an office that is up to the 
task, and to include in the description information concerning how 
additional information about the agency can be obtained. 
3. Recommendation 68-3, Parallel Table of Statutory Authorities 
and Rules (2 CFR Ch. 1).189 The Parallel Table is a two-column list of 
all statutory provisions on which agencies have relied in issuing regu-
lations that appear in the Code of Federal Regulations, together with 
the portion of the CFR where those regulations are found . This rec-
ommendation reports that the table is inaccurate and incomplete. It 
urges agencies to review their entries and submit corrections to the 
Office of the Federal Register ("OFR") and encourages the OFR to 
include in the table not only provisions cited by agencies in the formal 
statement of authority, but also provisions cited in preambles and 
codified text. 
4. Recommendation 68-4, Consumer Bulletin,190 recommends the 
publication, on a trial basis, of a bulletin, circulated to "the press, con-
sumer organizations, public and scholastic libraries, and individuals 
who request to be put on the mailing list,"191 describing recent federal 
agency actions of interest and significance to consumers. 
186 ACU S R ecommendation 68-1 . Adequate H e aring Facilities, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-1 (1988). 
187 R ECOMMENDATION 68-2, supra note 29. 
188 Id. a t 1. 
189 R ECOMMENDATION 68-3, supra note 31. 
190 R ECOMMENDATION 68-4, supra note 35. 
191 Id. at 1. 
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5. Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency 
Rulemaking of Direct Consequence to Them. 192 The most controver-
sial of the early recommendations, this multipart recommendation 
proposes several initiatives to ensure that federal agencies do not 
overlook the interests of poor people when conducting rulemakings. 
First, it urges federal agencies to undertake affirmative efforts and 
outreach to ensure they receive input from poor people with regard to 
rulemakings that may have a substantial effect on the poor. These 
efforts could include holding hearings in convenient locations, directly 
soliciting submissions from representatives of the poor, conducting 
field surveys of poor people, and setting up advisory committees con-
sisting of representatives of poor people. In addition, when necessary, 
agencies should reimburse individuals for expenses or lost wages at-
tributable to rulemaking participation. Third, Congress should au-
thorize and fund a quasi-governmental entity to serve as "People's 
Counsel," the staff of which would "represent the interests of the poor 
in all Federal administrative rulemaking substantially affecting the 
poor."193 
6. Recommendation 68-6, Delegation of Final Decisional Author-
ity Subject to Discretionary Review by the Agency,194 encourages devel-
opment of intermediate appellate panels within agencies and greater 
reliance on making initial decisions final, though subject to discretion-
ary review, so as to reduce the burdens on agency heads of having to 
review all formal adjudications. 
7. Recommendation 68-7, Elimination of Jurisdictional Amount 
Requirement in Judicial Review,195 urges elimination of the amount-in-
controversy requirement contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal-ques-
tion jurisdiction) in cases challenging agency action. 
8. Recommendation 68-8, Judicial Review of Interstate Com-
merce Commission Orders,196 recommends that Interstate Commerce 
Commission cases that are currently sent to a three-judge district 
court should instead be heard by the Courts of Appeals. 
9. Recommendation 69-1, Statutory Reform of the Sovereign Im-
munity Doctrine.197 Asserting that "[t]he technical legal defense of 
192 ACUS Recommendation 68-5, Representation of the Poor in Agency Rulemaking of 
Direct Consequence to Them, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-5 (1993). 
193 Id. at 58. 
194 ACUS Recommendation 68-6, Delegation of Final Decisional Authority Subject to Dis-
cretionary Review by the Agency, 1 C.F.R. § 305.68-6 (1993). 
195 RECOMMENDATION 68-7, supra note 73. 
196 RECOMMENDATION 68-8, supra note 78. 
197 RECOMMENDATION 69-1, supra note 75. 
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sovereign immunity ... has become in large measure unacceptable,"198 
this recommendation seeks amendments to sections 702 and 703 of 
the AP A to make clear that sovereign immunity does not bar chal-
lenges to agency action. 
10. Recommendation 69-2, Judicial Enforcement of Orders of the 
National Labor Relations Board,199 reasserts a recommendation from 
the temporary Administrative Conference of 1961-62 that orders of 
the NLRB, like those of all or most other agencies, be made automati-
cally judicially enforceable, without any further proceeding to obtain 
judicial confirmation of the orders' terms. 
11. Recommendation 69-3, Publication of a "Guide to Federal 
Reporting Requirements."200 Noting the popularity of the Guide to Re-
cord Retention Requirements, this endorses a counterpart publication 
listing agency-by-agency reporting requirements and their statutory or 
regulatory bases. 
12. Recommendation 69-4, Analytical Subject-Indexes to Selected 
Volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations,201 urges all agencies con-
tributing "substantially" to the CFR to determine whether analytic 
subject indexes for their CFR volumes would be appropriate, and, if 
so, to produce such indexes. 
13. Recommendation 69-5, Elimination of Duplicative Hearings 
in FAA Safety De-certification Cases,202 recommends that the FAA 
abandon its practice of conducting full trial-type hearings in order to 
make a preliminary determination that licenses or permits should be 
revoked prior to referring the matter to the National Transportation 
Safety Board, as that agency then holds its own full trial-type hearing 
before making a final determination. 
14. Recommendation 69-6, Compilation of Statistics on Adminis-
trative Proceedings by Federal Departments and Agencies,203 recom-
mends that agencies compile annual statistics tabulating the number 
and pace of resolution of all "proceedings" -rulemaking and adjudi-
cation, formal and informal-that fix the rights, privileges, and obliga-
tions of private entities. The goal is to learn and publicize just how 
many proceedings each agency began, had pending, and concluded in 
198 Id. at 1. 
199 ACUS Recommendation 69-2, Judicial Enforcement of Orders of the National Labor 
Relations Board, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-2 (1993). 
200 RECOMMENDATION 69-3, supra note 36. 
201 RECOMMENDATION 69-4, supra note 37. 
202 RECOMMENDATION 69-5, supra note 53. 
203 ACUS Recommendation 69-6, Compilation of Statistics on Administrative Proceedings 
by Federal Departments and Agencies, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-6 (1993}. 
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each year, leading to and enabling efforts to reduce delays and 
expense. 
15. Recommendation 69-7, Consideration of Alternatives in Li-
censing Procedures.204 Prompted by Scenic Hudson Preservation Con-
ference v. Federal Power Commission205 and similar decisions, this 
recommendation urges each licensing agency to develop agency-spe-
cific procedures and guidelines for consideration of alternatives to the 
applicant's proposed project. 
16. Recommendation 69-8, Elimination of Certain Exemptions 
from the APA Rulemaking Requirements.206 This two-prong attack on 
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2), which exempts rulemakings regarding "public 
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts,"207 calls on Congress to 
repeal the provision outright, and urges agencies voluntarily to pro-
vide notice and comment process for such rules even when not statu-
torily required except when there is good cause not to do so. 
17. Recommendation 69-9, Recruitment and Selection of Hearing 
Examiners; Continuing Training for Government Attorneys and Hear-
ing Examiners; Creation of a Center for Continuing Legal Education in 
Government.208 This recommendation contains a variety of proposals 
regarding hearing examiners, including expansion of the applicant 
pool, elimination of the veterans' preference, a three-year trial pro-
gram to test alternative selection measures, and expansion of continu-
ing legal education for hearing examiners within each agency, 
government-wide, and by private entities. 
18. Recommendation 70-1, Parties Defendant.209 This recom-
mendation sought to eliminate dismissal of actions against agencies 
where the plaintiff failed to identify properly the defendant; it called 
on the Department of Justice to call such defects to the courts' atten-
tion so that the plaintiff could amend its pleadings and on Congress to 
make statutory amendments to liberalize standards for naming gov-
ernment defendants and serving process. 
204 ACUS Recommendation 69-7, Consideration of Alternatives in Licensing Procedures, 1 
C.F.R. § 305.69-7 (1975). 
205 Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). 
206 ACUS Recommendation 69-8, Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the APA 
Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-8 (1993). 
201 Id. at 62. 
208 ACUS Recommendation 69-9, Recruitment and Selection of Hearing Examiners; Con-
tinuing Training for Government Attorneys and Hearing Examiners; Creation of a Center for 
Continuing Legal Education in Government, 1 C.F.R. § 305.69-9 (1988). 
209 RECOMME NDAT ION 70-1, supra note 76. 
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19. Recommendation 70-2, SEC No-Action Letters Under Section 
4 of the Securities Act of 1933,210 sought to increase the transparency 
and availability of the standards applied by the SEC in deciding 
whether to issue a no-action letter informing parties in advance of a 
transaction that SEC staff does not consider a violation of federal se-
curities laws. 
20. Recommendation 70-3, Summary Decision in Agency Adjudi-
cation.211 This is a model procedural rule providing for summary dis-
position in formal adjudications where there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact. 
21. Recommendation 70-4, Discovery in Agency Adjudication.212 
By far the lengthiest early recommendation, this lays out a set of mini-
mum procedural rules to govern discovery in formal adjudications. 
22. Recommendation 70-5, Practices and Procedures Under the 
Renegotiation Act of 1951,213 calls on the Renegotiation Board to 
make public the criteria it uses in decisionmaking, provide more ex-
tensive and thorough written decisions, and make available upon re-
quest by a contractor all reports it has received regarding the 
contractor's performance under existing contracts. 
210 RECOMMENDATION 70-2, supra note 39. 
211 ACUS Recommendation 70-3, Summary Decision in Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R. 
§ 305.70-3 (1993). 
212 ACUS Recommendation 70-4: Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R. § 305.70-4 
(1988). 
213 RECOMMENDATION 70-5, supra note 41. 
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APPENDIX B 
Recommendations from ACUS's Second First Three Years214 
1. Recommendation 2010-1, Agency Procedures for Considering 
Preemption of State Law.215 Reiterates a previous Conference recom-
mendation that Congress clearly state its preemptive intent in the text 
of the statutes it charges federal agencies with implementing. It rec-
ommends that agencies formulate appropriate internal procedures to 
ensure consultation with representatives of state interests and to en-
sure that agencies evaluate the authority and basis asserted in support 
of a preemptive rulemaking. It seeks to increase transparency regard-
ing internal agency policies and recommends ways to improve exter-
nal mechanisms for enforcing the applicable federal requirements. 
2. Recommendation 2011-1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemak-
ing.216 Provides guidance on issues that have arisen in light of the 
change from paper to electronic rulemaking procedures. 
3. Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments.217 Recog-
nizes innovations in the commenting process that could promote pub-
lic participation and improve rulemaking outcomes. The 
recommendation encourages agencies (1) to provide public guidance 
on how to submit effective comments, (2) to leave comment periods 
open for sufficient periods, generally at least sixty days for significant 
regulatory actions and thirty days for other rulemakings, (3) to post 
comments received online within a specified period after submission, 
(4) to announce policies for anonymous and late-filed comments, and 
(5) to consider when reply and supplemental comment periods are 
useful. 
4. Recommendation 2011-3, Compliance Standards for Govern-
ment Contractor Employees-Personal Conflicts of Interest and Use of 
Certain Non-Public Information.218 Responds to agencies' need to 
protect integrity and the public interest when they rely on contractors. 
214 These summaries are ACUS's, available at its website, www.acus.gov, but have in some 
instances been edited for length. 
215 ACUS Recommendation 2010-1, Agency Procedures for Considering Preemption of 
State Law, 76 Fed. Reg. 81 (Jan. 3, 2011). 
216 ACUS Recommendation 2011-1, Legal Considerations in e-Rulemaking, 76 Fed. Reg. 
48,789 (Aug. 9, 2011). 
211 ACUS Recommendation 2011-2, Rulemaking Comments, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,791 (Aug. 9, 
2011). 
218 ACUS Recommendation 2011-3, Compliance Standards for Government Contractor 
Employees-Personal Conflicts of Interest and Use of Certain Non-Public Information, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 48,792 (Aug. 9, 2011). 
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The Conference recommends that the Federal Acquisition Regulatory 
Council provide model language for agency contracting officers to use 
when negotiating or administering contracts that pose particular risks 
that employees of contractors could have personal conflicts of interest 
or could misuse non-public information. 
5. Recommendation 2011-4, Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best 
Practices and Possibilities for Expansion.219 Encourages agencies to 
consider the use of video teleconferencing technology for hearings 
and other administrative proceedings, sets out relevant factors, and 
identifies best practices for the implementation of this technology. 
6. Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference.220 Ad-
dresses legal and policy issues related to agencies' incorporation by 
reference in the Code of Federal Regulations of standards or other 
materials that have been published elsewhere. 
7. Recommendation 2011-6, International Regulatory Coopera-
tion.221 Addresses how U.S. regulators can interact with foreign au-
thorities to accomplish their domestic regulatory missions and 
eliminate unnecessary non-tariff barriers to trade, proposing en-
hanced cooperation and information gathering, more efficient deploy-
ment of limited resources, and better information exchanges. 
8. Recommendation 2011-7, The Federal Advisory Committee 
Act-Issues and Proposed Reforms.222 Includes proposals designed to 
clarify the scope of F ACA and its implementing regulations, alleviate 
certain procedural burdens associated with the existing regime, and 
promote "best practices" aimed at enhancing the transparency and 
objectivity of the advisory committee process. 
9. Recommendation 2011-8, Agency Innovations in E-Rulemak-
ing.223 Addresses how federal agency rulemaking can be improved by 
better use of Internet-based technologies. The recommendation also 
addresses the issue of improving e-rulemaking participation by those 
who have historically faced barriers to access, including non-English 
219 ACUS Recommendation 2011-4, Agency Use of Video Hearings: Best Practices and 
Possibilities for Expansion, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,795 (Aug. 9, 2011). 
220 ACUS Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257 (Jan. 
17, 2012). 
221 ACUS Recommendation 2011-6, International Regulatory Cooperation, 77 Fed. Reg. 
2259 (Jan. 17, 2012). 
222 ACUS Recommendation 2011-7, The Federal Advisory Committee Act-Issues and 
Proposed Reforms, 77 Fed. Reg. 2261 (Jan. 17, 2012). 
223 ACUS Recommendation 2011-8, Agency Innovations in E-Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. 
2264 (Jan. 17, 2012). 
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speakers, users of low-bandwidth Internet connections, and individu-
als with disabilities. 
10. Recommendation 2012-1, Regulatory Analysis Require-
ments.224 Considers the various regulatory analysis requirements im-
posed upon agencies by both executive orders and statutes. It offers 
recommendations designed to ensure that agencies satisfy the existing 
requirements in the most efficient and transparent manner possible. It 
also provides recommendations on streamlining the existing analysis 
requirements. 
11. Recommendation 2012-2, Midnight Rules.225 Addresses sev-
eral issues raised by the publication of rules in the final months of a 
presidential administration. The recommendation offers a number of 
proposals for limiting the practice of issuing midnight rules by incum-
bent administrations and enhancing the powers of incoming adminis-
trations to review midnight rules. 
12. Recommendation 2012-3, Immigration Removal Adjudica-
tion.226 Suggests a number of ways to enhance efficiency and fairness 
in immigration removal cases. 
13. Recommendation 2012-4, Paperwork Reduction Act.227 Rec-
ommends ways to improve public engagement in the creation and re-
view of information collection requests and to make the process more 
efficient for the agencies and the Office of Management and Budget. 
It also suggests ways to streamline the review and approval process 
without increasing the burden on the public of agency information 
collections. 
14. Recommendation 2012-5, Improving Coordination of Related 
Agency Responsibilities.228 Addresses the problem of overlapping and 
fragmented procedures associated with assigning multiple agencies 
similar or related functions, or dividing authority among agencies. 
The recommendation proposes some reforms aimed at improving co-
ordination of agency policymaking, including joint rulemaking, inter-
agency agreements, agency consultation provisions, and tracking and 
evaluating the effectiveness of coordination initiatives. 
224 ACUS Recommendation 2012-1 , Regulatory Analysis Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 
47,801 (Aug. 10, 2012). 
225 ACUS Recommendation 2012-2, Midnight Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,802 (Aug. 10, 2012). 
226 ACUS Recommendation 2012-3, Immigration Removal Adjudication, 77 Fed. Reg. 
47,804 (Aug. 10, 2012). 
227 ACUS Recommendation 2012-4, Paperwork Reduction Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,808 (Aug. 
10, 2012). 
22s ACUS Recommendation 2012-5, Improving Coordination of Related Agency Responsi-
bilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,810 (Aug. 10, 2012). 
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15. Recommendation 2012-6, Reform of 28 U.S.C. Section 
1500.229 Urges Congress to repeal section 1500, which divests the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims of jurisdiction when a plaintiff has claims 
against the government based on substantially the same operative 
facts pending in another court, and replace it with a provision that 
would create a presumption that in such circumstances later-filed ac-
tions would be stayed. 
16. Recommendation 2012-7, Agency Use of Third-Party Pro-
grams to Assess Regulatory Compliance.230 Sets forth guidance for 
federal agencies that are establishing, or considering establishing, pro-
grams in which third parties assess whether regulated entities are in 
compliance with regulatory standards and other requirements. 
17. Recommendation 2012-8, Inflation Adjustment Act.231 Ad-
dresses issues under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment 
Act,232 urging Congress to change the current statutory framework to 
address three provisions that result in penalty adjustments that may 
not track the actual rate of inflation. 
18. Recommendation 2013-1, Improving Consistency in Social 
Security Disability Adjudications.233 Identifies ways to improve the 
adjudication of Social Security disability benefits claims before admin-
istrative law judges and the Appeals Council, suggests changes to the 
evaluation of opinion evidence from medical professionals, and en-
courages the agency to enhance data capture and reporting. 
19. Recommendation 2013-2, Benefit-Cost Analysis at Indepen-
dent Regulatory Agencies.234 Highlights a series of best practices di-
rected at independent regulatory agencies in the preparation of 
benefit-cost analyses that accompany proposed and final rules. 
20. Recommendation 2013-3, Science in the Administrative Pro-
cess.235 Promotes transparency in agencies' scientific decisionmaking, 
229 ACUS Recommendation 2012-6, Reform of 28 U.S.C. Section 1500, 78 Fed. Reg. 2939 
(Jan. 15, 2013). 
230 ACUS Recommendation 2012-7, Agency Use of Third-Party Programs to Assess Regu-
latory Compliance, 78 Fed. Reg. 2941 (Jan. 15, 2013) . 
231 ACUS Recommendation 2012-8, Inflation Adjustment Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 2943 (Jan. 15, 
2013). 
232 Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-410, 104 Stat. 
890. 
233 ACUS Recommendation 2013-1 , Improving Consistency in Social Security Disability 
Adjudications, 78 Fed. Reg. 41 ,352 (July 10, 2013). 
234 ACUS Recommendation 2013-2, Benefit-Cost Analysis at Independent Regulatory 
Agencies, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,355 (July 10, 2013). 
235 ACUS Recommendation 2013-3, Science in the Administrative Process, 78 Fed. Reg. 
41 ,357 (July 10, 2013). 
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including: articulation of questions to be informed by scientific infor-
mation; attribution for agency personnel who contributed to scientific 
analyses; public access to underlying data and literature; and conflict-
of-interest disclosures for privately funded research used by the agen-
cies in licensing, rulemaking, or other administrative processes. 
21. Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Record in In-
formal Rulemaking.236 Offers best practices for agencies in the compi-
lation, preservation, and certification of records in informal 
rulemaking, and supports the judicial presumption of regularity for 
agency administrative records except in certain limited circumstances. 
22. Recommendation 2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking.237 
Provides guidance to agencies on whether, how, and when social me-
dia might be used both lawfully and effectively to support rulemaking 
activities. 
23. Recommendation 2013-6, Remand Without Vacatur.238 Ex-
amines the judicial remedy of remand without vacatur on review of 
agency actions and equitable factors that may justify its application. 
The recommendation offers guidance for courts that remand agency 
actions and for agencies responding to judicial remands. 
24. Recommendation 2013-7, GPRA Modernization Act of 2010: 
Examining Constraints To, and Providing Tools For, Cross-Agency 
Collaboration.239 Examines perceived and real constraints to cross-
agency collaboration under the Government Performance and Results 
Act (GPRA) Modernization Act240 and highlights tools available to 
help agencies collaborate. It offers guidance to help increase trans-
parency, improve information sharing, and facilitate better agency re-
porting under the Act. The recommendation is also aimed at 
enhancing the role of agency attorneys and other agency staff in facili-
tating cross-agency collaboration. 
25. Statement # 18 (2013), Improving the Timeliness of OIRA 
Regulatory Review.241 Without making an actual recommendation, 
236 ACUS Recommendation 2013-4, The Administrative Record in Informal Rulemaking, 
78 Fed. Reg. 41,358 (July 10, 2013). 
237 ACUS Recommendation 2013-5, Social Media in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,269 
(Dec. 17, 2013). 
238 ACUS Recommendation 2013-6, Remand Without Vacatur, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,272 (Dec. 
17, 2013). 
239 ACUS Recommendation 2013-7, GPRA Modernization Act of 2010: Examining Con-
straints to, and Providing Tools for, Cross-Agency Collaboration, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,273 (Dec. 17, 
2013). 
240 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Modernization Act, 5 U.S.C. § 306; 
31 u.s.c. §§ 1115-16, 1120-25 (2012). 
241 ACUS Statement# 18, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013). 
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this statement highlights potential mechanisms for improving review 
times of rules under review by the Office of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs ("OIRA"), including promoting enhanced coordination 
between OIRA and agencies prior to the submission of rules, encour-
aging increased transparency concerning the reasons for delayed re-
views, and ensuring that OIRA has adequate staffing to complete 
reviews in a timely manner. 
